

DDI 1881-67

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2 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Status of Hanoi Thermal Power Plant, [redacted]

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25X1 1. This memorandum provides information on the status of the Hanoi Power Plant, [redacted]

[redacted] and comments in paragraph 5 on the value of an additional strike against the power plant.

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25X1 2. In our Intelligence Memorandum [redacted]

[redacted] the following observations were made regarding electric power in Hanoi.

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a. Prior to the initiation of the Rolling Thunder program, the Hanoi plant with a capacity of 32,500 kw accounted for 24 percent of the central generating network. Immediately prior to the attacks on the Hanoi plant on 19 May and 21 May this plant was the only remaining undamaged plant in the central power network. It was estimated that the Hanoi plant had the capacity to supply only about one-half of the city's normal requirements for residential, commercial, and industrial power. Our memorandum indicated that there were some reports of power rationing in Hanoi on 10 May 1967, nine days before the first strike against the Hanoi facility.

b. As of 25 May 1967, the date of our memorandum, we concluded from preliminary reporting that the boilerhouse probably had been damaged [redacted]

[redacted] We indicated that Hanoi was reported to have a reserve power system of five underground diesel stations with an estimated capacity of 5,000 kw -- less than 10 percent of Hanoi's normal needs.

25X1 3. [redacted] we indicated to a member of Mr. Rostow's staff on 30 May 1967 that damage to the power plant probably was not heavy. This estimate was checked with DIA which initially concluded [redacted]

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25X1 [redacted] the plant was not heavily damaged and could be restored to one-half of rated capacity in only five days. The next day and prior to a White House briefing, DIA modified its position [redacted]

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25X1 [redacted] and concluded that possible extensive interior damage had occurred [redacted]

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
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Editorial
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DIA review(s) completed.

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
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indicates that damage to the plant may have been somewhat heavier than preliminary reports indicated. DIA estimates that it may take 30 days to restore the plant's capacity to 5,000 kw. We feel that this assessment overstates the damage to the plant. GDR and IAG analysis [redacted]

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One-third of the plant's capacity is probably down for a long period of time. However, we estimate that at least one-third and possibly more of the plant's capacity is presently in operation. Therefore,

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a successful re-strike would seriously interrupt North Vietnamese attempts to restore a major portion of Hanoi's power capacity. We emphasize, however, that even the complete destruction of the Hanoi Plant will not eliminate all power in Hanoi. The diesel stations reported to be in operation and other portable generating units will permit the North Vietnamese to maintain minimum power in hospitals, command centers, diplomatic quarters and, at least on an intermittent basis, in some residential areas of Hanoi.

15/

R. J. SMITH
Deputy Director for Intelligence

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